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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
mental and business functions, but the court implies one, and quoting Andrews
v. South Haven, 187 Mich. 29, 153 N. W. 827, "In exercising its business powers,
a city is governed by the same rules which control a private individual or busi-
ness corporation under like circumstances." The court further says that inas-
much as the city voluntarily goes into the same business as private citizens,
there is no good reason why it should be given special privileges not enjoyed
by others who are compelled to meet its competition. Cases in accord with the
principal case are: Henry v. Lincoln, 93 Nebr. 331, 140 N. W. 664, 50 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 174; D'Amico v. Boston, 176 Mass. 599, 58 N. E. 158; Cook v. Beatrice,
207 N. W. 518 (Nebr. 1926).
A contrary view is expressed in Dickie v. Centralia, 91 Wash. 467, 157 Pac.
1084; Western Salt Co. v. San Diego, 181 Cal. 696, 186 Pac. 345; O'Neil v.
Richmond, 141 Va. 168, 126 S. E. 56; Shear v. Everett, 134 Wash. 389, 235 Pac.
789; Frasch v. New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. W. 121.
It is submitted that the principal case is wrongly decided. Perhaps the ends
of justice were served, but the court by judicial legislation, flies in the teeth of
the express words of the statute. The purpose of the statute requiring notice
is to advise the city in what its alleged negligence exists, and to afford it an
opportunity at an early date to investigate the nature and cause of the injury
while the conditions remain substantially the same. Canon City v. Cox, 133
Pac. 1040 (Colo.) And it is as important that the city have notice of a claim
for injury caused by it while acting in a business capacity as when it acts in a
governmental capacity. Frasch v. New Ulm, supra. The fact that the city
and private corporations have similar liabilities does not preclude the legislature
from making distinctions between them in respect to conditions precedent to
suit. More and more cities are buying and managing public utilities; such
action is deemed beneficial and convenient to its inhabitants. Every reason
which calls for the service of a written notice of claim upon a municipality be-
fore suit in any case where it acts in a governmental capacity applies in this case.
The funds of a city pay both types of claims. J. N., '29.
NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE AS NEGLIGENCE PER S.-The plaintiff
was struck by a street car of the defendant, driven at the time at a speed
greater than that allowed by a city ordinance. Held, that that violation of the
ordinance constituted negligence per se. Unterlachner v. Wells, 296 S. W. 755
(Mo., 1927).
There is a division of authority on this question. Some courts hold
that the violation of an ordinance is not of itself negligence, but merely
evidence from which the jury may infer negligence, taking into consideration
other facts of the case. This is the rule in Massachusetts, Harlan v. Railway
Co., 129 Mass. 310; Michigan, Rotter v. Detroit U. R. Co., 171 N. W. 514; New
York, McGrath v. N. Y. C., 63 N. Y. 52; and Ohio, Meek v. Penna. Ry. Co., 38
Ohio St. 632.
The reasoning in such cases is that the ordinance is merely a police regulation
subjecting the violator to penalties, and that it cannot serve to create a liability
where none existed before. To hold violation to be negligence in itself is to
perfmit the city council to legislate concerning civil liability, a matter outside of
its power and intention. But the courts do hold that the violation characterizes
the conduct of the defendant, and is therefore evidence of his lack of care.
The other view, that the violation is negligence per se, is followed principally
in Alabama, S. & N. Ala. R. Co. v. Donovan, 84 Ala. 141; Georgia, Cent. R. Co.
v. Tribble, 112 Ga. 863; Indiana, Union Traction Co. v. Wynkoop, 154 N. E. 40;
and in Texas, Tex. etc. R. Co. v. Ball, 85 S. W. 456. The theory underlying this
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view is that the city, for the protection of the public, has established a standard
of care, to which it is the duty of the defendant to conform. The carrier owes
this duty to the injured party, as a part of the public, and a breach of it gives
rise to a cause of action in his favor.
Besides these two main rules there is an intermediate holding in Illinois, that
the violation of the ordinance creates a prima facie case of negligence rebuttable
by other evidence, C. & E. L R. Co. v. Crose, 214 Ill. 602. The Illinois rule is
followed in McElhinney v. Knittle, 201 N. W. 586 (Iowa). Kentucky has an ex-
treme holding that the ordinance is inadmissible for any purpose in a civil
action. Ford v. Paducah City Ry. Co., 99 S. W. 355, and L. & N. R. Co. v.
Dalton, 102 Ky. 290.
Logically the Massachusetts rule is correct. A public wrong does not create
a private right, and violation of a police regulation is mere evidence of want of
care. But as a matter of public policy, the doctrine of negligence per se is
more likely to enforce obedience to municipal ordinances, and the tendency is to
change that rule.
The history of this ruling in Missouri shows a rather interesting development.
The early cases, Liddy v. Ry. Co., 40 Mo. 516, and Karle v. R. R. Co., 55 Mo.
476, held that the violation of a statute was negligence per se. Then came the
case of Fath v. Tower Grove etc. Ry. Co., 105 Mo. 537, in which the court said
that the ordinance, when accepted by the railway company, became a contract
between it and the city and under the authority of Mayor of Lime Regis v.
Henley, 1 Bing. 222, held that the city's right of action for the breach of this
contract inured to the benefit of the plaintiff, Fath. This case was followed by
Byinton v. St. L. & Sub. Ry. Co., 147 Mo. 673, in which the plaintiff was not
'allowed to recover because it was not shown that the railway had ever accepted
the ordinance in question. Murphy v. Lindell Ry. Co., 153 Mo. 252, and Holwer-
son v. St. L. & Sub. Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 245, in accord.
Shortly after the Holwerson case, supra, the case of Jackson v. Ry. Co., 157
Mo. 635, was decided, expressly overruling Fath v. Ry. Co., supra, and re-
establishing the doctrine of Karle v. Ry. Co., supra. It held that an ordinance is
a police regulation and not a contract; and its violation is negligence per se.
This rule has been followed down to date in Missouri. Sluder v. Transit Co.,
189 Mo. 107, Henderson v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 248 S. W. 987, and Unter-
lachner v. Wells, 296 S. W. 755. C. J. E. '28.
WEAPONs-PISTOLs---AMGUNs.--The defendant was convicted under a New
York statute for having a "pistol, revolver, or other firearm of a size which
may be concealed upon the person, without a written license therefor." Upon
appeal his conviction was reversed and he was discharged. An examination of
the "pistol" proved that the projectile used was propelled by compressed air,
and was in no way connected with a projectile moved by gun powder or other
similar inflammable material. Held, that the possession of an air pistol does
not warrant conviction of unlawfully possessing a firearm. The basis of this
distinction was that the court felt unwilling to read a forced or subtle meaning
into the statute as it used the term "firearm." In re People v. Schmidt, 222 N. Y.
S. 647 (1927).
In Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N. W. 437 (1892), the supreme court
was called upon to make a distinction between an air gun and a firearm in de-
ciding on the negligence of a father in buying an air gun for a minor son.
They held that an air gun was not a firearm, on the ground that a firearm is a
weapon which acts by the force of gun powder, and that it was intended as a
toy and did not have a dangerous character.
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